This article compares the performance of the Portuguese water services (WS) according to their ownership. Several techniques, such as performance indicators, total factor productivity and data envelopment analysis were used. First, the paper describes the water sector institutional framework in Portugal. Then, it reviews the major theories that relate performance to WS ownership and the main empirical studies developed in this area. Finally, it presents the case study. The conclusions drawn from the study seem to prove the outperformance of the WS under private management in Portugal when compared with the public ones. The quality of service provided by the former is better than that of the latter, which is particularly evident with regard to water quality. Productivity is also superior in private companies. However, the results suggest an opposite trend as far as efficiency is concerned.
Introduction
A water services (WS) institutional framework cannot be disentangled from its ownership and management. Possible configurations comprise especially regulated private activity, concessions to private companies under public control and direct management by the state (Marques, 2005) . They are respectively called English, French and public management models in the water sector (Kraemer, 1999) . Other options, such as deregulation or self-regulation, are not suitable for WS, at least for now. Several reasons can be pointed out to justify this point of view, including the fact that WS operate under a natural monopoly regime (with the associated scale economies), the presence of scope and density economies, the provision of a service of general economic interest, the need for a high, long-lasting and sunk capital, the existence of asymmetric information and externalities and the supply of a quasi-public good (Marques, 2005) . All these factors demand explicit regulation or very tight public supervision. Moreover, the characteristics of water, such as its inability to be replaced (unlike gas, electricity and telecommunications) 1 , its heterogeneity (electricity, gas and fixed telephone are considered to be relatively homogeneous goods and services), the significant negative and positive externalities of the environment and public health (presence of several regulators), its development and technological progress and its business value, which is lower in these sectors (compared to telecommunications and energy), constrain the competition. In addition, the fixed costs part, mainly that related to distribution and transportation (around 2/3 of the capital costs, when compared to 2/5 in gas and 1/3 in electricity), is much higher in the WS (CA, 2000) . The consumption distribution is also more penalising for different uses 2 . WS are highly fragmented and there is no national network structure and only some regional ones, as in other utilities. This reality restrains the third party access, mainly because the water has a significant weight and therefore its transportation involves a high cost. WS networks are also complex, depending on the regions and places served and demand a permanent balance between pressure and flow. Finally, unlike other network infrastructures, WS continue to be vertically integrated, which complicates the restructuring process that aims to separate their different activities 3 .
In the English and French models mentioned above, the private sector has a leading role in WS management, whereas in the public management model its responsibility is limited, at the best, to the provision of outsourcing services. In spite of all the studies which have been made, it is important to revisit the theme of the ownership effects on WS performance, as this is still a current issue. This is also a prevailing matter in Portugal (as in many other countries), in particular with regard to state functions and size. It must be stressed that the term privatisation is very encompassing in the water sector and that it not only comprises the sale of assets but also private management and even, sometimes (although controversial), the change from the public law to private or commercial law (Marques & Monteiro, 2004a) . A further point is that introduction of the private sector into WS generally follows the French model. Exceptions are England and Wales and other occasional cases, such as some WS in Chile, Sweden or the Czech Republic. The model embraced in the water sector in Portugal, described below, is rooted in the French model of franchising, despite presenting some particular features. After analysis of the Portuguese regulatory environment, a short review of the main strands and studies that compare WS performance between the private and public sectors is made. Then, a comparison of the Portuguese WS performance is carried out, trying to correlate the results with their ownership. The tools used for this purpose were the performance indicators (PIs), the total factor productivity (TFP) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). Finally, the major conclusions are presented.
The Portuguese model

A false French model
The institutional model adopted in Portugal is based on the French regulatory and development model. Responsibility for WS rests with the municipalities, which can delegate their operation to the 1 Water can be classified as an inelastic good, especially when its use meets essential needs (Nauges & Thomas, 2000) . 2 In WS the most relevant part of consumption concerns the domestic volume. The industrial customers can make more use of their own water sources. 3 The exception is the possibility of yardstick competition whose intention is to stimulate and replace an absent market with a real market.
R. Cunha Marques / Water Policy 10 (2008) 25-42 26 private sector by public tender. However, the WS framework is endowed with some specific characteristics. First, there has been a clear concern about separating "bulk" water from direct water distribution with all the advantages and inconveniences associated with this option. A positive factor is the amalgamation of municipalities into integrated systems, which allow better management, more service reliability and wider resources optimisation. A negative aspect is that these systems restrain the municipal systems effectiveness (e.g. scope economies), competing with them for EU funding grants. Second, the state, by means of its entrepreneurial sector, is the main player in Portugal, controlling the whole "bulk" water market and having an important position in the water distribution segment with regard to the concession contracts of municipal services and in several companies that provide complementary services. In France, the institutional model gives preference to the entry and participation of the private sector rather than to the state (as operator), in contrast to what is happening in Portugal. Third, there is a sector-specific regulator for the WS which, in spite of having a reduced scope of responsibilities and a design similar to a public institute, intends to act as a "watchdog" for the quality of service and to assure the sustainable development of this sector.
Legal framework
In Portugal, with the exception of Lisbon, until the 1990s, WS management was performed by the municipalities 4 . The Executive Law 379 was enacted in 1993 to allow access to private capital, which had not been accessible until then, to the economic activities of water catchment, treatment and distribution for public consumption, as well as wastewater collection, treatment and disposal. According to this law, multi-municipal systems are those that provide bulk water (without direct distribution) or undertake large interception (without sewer network) for at least two municipalities and demand a high investment from the government (central) for reasons of national interest. Municipal systems constitute all the others, even though they are managed by municipal associations. This law also enables the government to give concessions (without competitive tender) for the operation and management of multi-municipal systems to a public company or companies with a major state capital shareholding and the municipalities to give concessions for the operation and management of municipal systems to companies without restriction with regard to capital shareholding (subject to competitive tender) or users associations. In 1998, the Law 58 defined the legal terms for the creation of municipal companies according to three frameworks, the first corresponding to one municipality, the second to more than one (inter-municipal company) municipality and the third to one or more municipalities with a private partner (mixed company) chosen by public tender.
In 1993, with the admission of private capital, the government realised that these sectors needed to be supervised and set up a Concession Accompanying Committee and the National Observatory for the Multi-municipal and Municipal Systems which were replaced by the Institute for the Regulation of Water and Waste (IRAR) in 1996. The aims of IRAR are to ensure the quality of the services provided and to supervise the financial equilibrium and sustainability of the sector, under the terms of its statutes and the law. WS under municipal management (municipal services without autonomy, municipal services with autonomy and municipal companies) are not subject to the intervention of IRAR in economic and quality of service issues 5 .
Franchising in Portugal
In Portugal, historically, governments have had the possibility of choosing a WS management model with some flexibility. The first known systems were awarded to foreign private companies at the end of the 19th century due to the lack of technical know-how until then about the construction and operation of water supply systems. In a later phase, the central administration and the municipalities reassumed their management role. In 1977, with the advent of Law 46 it became clear that access to the WS operation and management was closed to the private sector. This state of affairs only changed in 1993 with the legal regulation of the concessions. This type of private sector participation, within the delegated management, is one that confers more powers to the private sector. Until December 2005, 29 concession tenders of water supply and wastewater systems took place (direct distribution), corresponding to 2.3 million inhabitants, around 22% of the Portuguese population. At that time, 20 systems were working (nearly 1.6 million inhabitants). Table 1 presents the concessions arrangements in Portugal until the end of 2005. Lately, the dominant kind of private sector participation has been the creation of mixed companies. These are municipal companies which include a minority private partner. Recently, Portugal has been watching a proliferation in the number of municipal companies and by the end of 2005 there were 14 municipal companies, comprising about 16% of the population. Table 2 presents the WS modes of organisation in the country.
The problems presented by the institutional framework in Portugal intensify the franchising disadvantages (Marques, 2005) . First, one of the main reasons for the use of franchising is the competition generated in access to the market. Public tenders have been taking place without much competition owing to an insufficient number of players. On the other hand, some tenders are not attractive to the private sector (very high investments and rents and overstated requirements) owing to their size (e.g. Trancoso) or the promoters' high expectations (e.g. Lousada). Second, despite the existence of some authorities responsible for supervision of concessions, such as the Municipal Parliaments, at least until December 2005 they were not adequately monitored at different levels, including scheduling, programme implementation and the quality of service delivered. Third, the Portuguese municipalities, with some exceptions, do not have an appropriate size to make concessions workable or enough know-how to supervise them. Finally, the laws enacted are clearly insufficient, admitting excess freedom to the contractors and concessionaires, inter alia, regarding information obligations, publicising of accounts and performance standards, the fulfilling of obligations in the scope of the services of general economic interest and the complaints handling procedure. 
Public versus private water utilities
In contrast to the English or French models, in which the private sector prevails, the state can be, simultaneously, the owner and operator of infrastructure services, by means of public companies or by other public management modes of organisation, ensuring that, as a shareholder and by direct intervention in the market, these utilities behave in order to optimise the social welfare. The foremost goal of the public company is, for this reason, different from that of the private company. While the private company tries to maximise its profits, the public company, at least theoretically, aims at optimisation of social welfare. In fact the latter, in an ideal scenario, can put lower prices into practice and fulfil more social objectives (Laffont & Tirole, 1993) , as it does not focus on maximisation of profits and its management is centralised (by the government), mitigating the differences and conflicts of interest that usually exist (e.g. those between regulators and shareholders).
However, the reality is very different. Public companies are, in general, inefficient and show great instability in their management and development strategies. There are several factors that drive public companies many times to present worse efficiency, inter alia a lack of pressure and discipline from capital markets and shareholders eagerness for high earnings (in the public sector ownership is not transferred, while in the private sector less efficient and profitable companies are vulnerable to takeovers), the non-existence of budget limits (public companies do not go bankrupt), the excessive use of resources for purposes that maximise their self-interest (the intention of senior bureaucrats and of government to keep their mandates and increase their salaries and benefits) and the presence of asymmetric information 6 . The absence of a strategic vision is motivated by the lack of clear aims and by the arbitrariness displayed by each successive government and by the occasional existence of lobbies. The network infrastructures management is not tailored to short-term objectives (with a length of time analogous to a government mandate). The interference of politicians in the economy is, undoubtedly, the Achilles' heel of public companies. A possible solution would be the implementation of independent regulation. Nevertheless, this hypothesis, taking place in some countries and in certain sectors, is not exempt from difficulties. Finally, it should be noticed that the government budgets are constrained more and more by strict economic policies, such as deficit control in the EU, which are not compatible with the high investments generally required by the network industries. In these situations, privatisation can be unavoidable (the so-called scissors effect). In other cases, the creation and growth of public companies are not related to social welfare maximisation but rather to a government strategy of assets capitalisation (creation of national champions).
Inefficiency in the public sector is justified by three different theoretical models, namely, the property rights theory (there is no ownership transference in the public sector), the public choice theory (bureaucrats maximise their own benefit and not the common interest) and the principal agent theory (endorsed by information asymmetries). These theories, discussed in several documents (see Byrnes, 1985; Vining & Boardman, 1992; and Renzetti & Dupont, 2002) , can justify the judgement, a priori, that in Portugal the private WS are more efficient than the public ones. In fact, most Portuguese public utilities (especially the municipal services without autonomy) provide a poor service, operating systematically under economic deficit 7 . This circumstance could not happen if the WS management was private. Furthermore, there is a dangerous mixture between politics and economy, causing these services very often to be used as a political weapon which jeopardises their efficiency and sustainability (Marques, 2006) . Local politicians show an exaggerated influence by being too close to the population. Finally, public managers, mostly civil servants, do not have the incentives and the benefits provided by the private sector, neither are they evaluated according to the results achieved.
Although these theories are valuable, research carried out in the past, which compare the public with private utilities performance, reveal inconsistency with regard to the results. There are publications that grant advantage to the private utilities, others to the public ones and others that do not make any distinction between them. Table 3 displays the main studies carried out until now in the water sector.
In addition to a justification based on the techniques used (parametric, non-parametric, frontier, nonfrontier, deterministic, stochastic. . .), a procedure usually followed by researchers, it is necessary to stress that various factors intervene directly in this analysis. Hence, the private utilities can be very efficient in a given country and in another the opposite scenario might prevail 8 . It is commonly believed that the Dutch WS are among the most efficient in the world, along with some Australian WS, which are public entities. In a more detailed analysis it is possible to confirm that these WS are managed as if they were private companies (PLC) and that there is self-regulation or sector-specific regulation with the function of stimulating and replacing the market. Furthermore, market power is a key factor in this analysis at several levels (Vickers & Yarrow, 1989) , as well as the implementation of volunteer or compulsory benchmarking schemes that can bring about very good results, irrespective of the companies public or private nature (Marques, 2006) . Thus, in this area, it is important to take into account the regulation (or self-regulation) role, WS corporatisation, the degree of outsourcing, the market structure (scale, scope and density economies), accountability, autonomy and the civil servants assessment, among other factors.
Methodologies adopted
Introduction
In comparing the performance of public and private WS, diverse methodologies were used. First, PIs were applied to the whole Portuguese WS for the years 2003 and 2004. The elements were collected through an enquiry (APDA, 2004) and through the information published by the regulator (IRAR, 2005) . Second, the TFP was determined in order to examine the productivity change between 1994 and 2001. This analysis, like that of the efficiency, was based on a recent study of WS efficiency and productivity (Marques, 2005) . The sample comprised 56 WS (57% of the population). The information was collected from official documents and complemented with enquiries and direct contacts with the WS. Finally, the DEA technique was employed to compare the efficiency of public and private WS. This examination 
Performance indicators (PIs)
The transparent meaning and easy calculation of PIs lead their computation to be the most adopted methodology in the performance evaluation of the water sector. Several recent studies propose and standardise a set of PIs corresponding to different perspectives and diverse aims (Alegre et al., 2000; AWWA, 2005) . In this research three aspects were considered, particularly the quality of water supplied, water losses and personnel efficiency.
The indicators, which are the number of water tests not performed (%) in accordance with what is compulsory by law and the number of analyses of "quality of water supplied" that do not comply with the legislation (%), were the measures used to evaluate the water quality. Table 4 shows the statistical results summary of the comparison made for the year 2004. The statistical analysis is displayed in Table 5 . It was observed that the water quality PIs are, on average, more punishing for the public WS than for the private ones. As a rule of thumb, the private WS do more analyses of the water and disregard its quality parameters less. As emphasised in Table 5 , the hypothesis tested by the T and WMW tests of whether the averages of the two water quality indicators for the public and private companies were equivalent was rejected with a significance level of 5%. The hypotheses of normality were fulfilled, validating the T test and the assumption of variances equality was also accepted (Levene test).
With regard to the water losses problem, the indicators of non-revenue water (NRW) in %, NRW by mains length (l km 21 h
21
), NRW by customer (l cu. 21 day
) and NRW by service connection (l sc.
day 21 ) were computed for the public and private WS. In order to understand the units of PIs we should read cu as customer and sc as service connection. It is known that urban systems (which reflect a high customer density, usually over 125 customers per pipe km) are, in general, penalised and as such the benchmark here should not be done solely based on the indicator in percent (Marques et. al., 2005) . Thus, a WS with a NRW indicator of 20% might be very efficient for an urban system but not so efficient for a rural one. Water losses are not only an economic indicator, but also an indicator of the service and environmental quality (and operational quality, as well) 10 . Table 6 presents the comparison of results for the year 2003. It is noticeable that the public companies performance is, on average, lower than the private companies with regard to water losses. However, as shown in Table 7 , the hypothesis testing whether the averages of the various water loss indicators for public and private companies were equivalent was accepted with a significance level of 5%. The hypotheses of normality were fulfilled, validating the T test. The assumption of variances equality is not always accepted (Levene test), with effects at the WMW test level. 9 It must be stressed that the conclusion reached using these methods is somewhat restricted, as the private sector participation is recent and not truly consolidated. Besides, it is natural that the costs, in the first years, are higher than in the following ones. Another key aspect to be highlighted is that despite the existence of a sector-specific regulation, only in 2005 did it really start to produce effects on performance improvement. 10 The largest part of the water losses corresponds to leakages resulting from failures which, consequently, cause interruptions in the water supply. Only in the case of very high levels (. 25-30% of the total volume), or in situations where the production cost is very high, is it profitable (after the so-called economic level of leakage) to launch campaigns for leakage detection.
Afterwards, the study computed the PIs related to personnel productivity, in particular the staff number by revenue water volume (no. ). The results attained are presented in Table 8 . It was possible to observe that the personnel PIs are also, on average, more penalising for the public WS than for the private ones, that is, the latter are, as a rule, more efficient regarding staff productivity than their public counterparts. Following the same procedure concerning the statistical analysis, it was observed that in two indicators, the staff number by revenue water volume and the staff number by customer, respectively, the hypotheses that tested their averages equality should be rejected but, in contrast, the other hypotheses admitted with an adopted significance level of 5% should be accepted. These results, displayed in Table 9 , were expected owing, especially, to the higher randomness of the staff number by mains length and by service connections, since the influence of these parameters is highly dependent on network social characteristics (urban, semi-urban or rural features). As underlined before, for example, an urban network with a small mains length may have more interventions than a network with a large size and rural characteristics, thus requiring a high number of staff to accomplish all the functions. Finally, it should be pointed out that the private WS make more use of outsourcing.
In this rough analysis involving three sets of PIs it is interesting to note that there are relevant differences between the results, although the private WS seem to be more efficient. In the matter of water quality this fact is unquestionable. In the water losses indicators the outperformance of private utilities is suggested, though not very clearly, while in the personnel indicators the gap between the private and public management is wider. Possibly, these aspects are handled in a different way by the decision makers, because even this last indicator has direct consequences over the utilities profits as it represents a very important part of the total cost (more than 50% in several WS). In contrast, although an improvement in the water losses indicators can produce effects at the economic results level, this relationship is not so clear. As far as the water quality issue is concerned, owing to its public exposure, the private sector cannot be unsuccessful. 
Total factor productivity (TFP)
TFP is a generalisation of the PI concept dealing with all multiple inputs and all multiple outputs. TFP is the ratio between the sum of all the weighted outputs (y) and the sum of all the weighted inputs (x), as shown by Equation (1), where M and N represent the total number of outputs and the total number of inputs, and a i and b j are the outputs and the inputs weights, respectively.
The TFP was computed by means of the Törnqvist and Fisher indexes. The model applied comprised two outputs and three inputs. The outputs are made up by the revenue water volume and the water customers' number. The inputs cover the staff number, the capital and the other quantities of operation and maintenance (O/M). The outputs are weighted through the revenues that each one of them produces, which are the water sales for the revenue water volume and the meter tariff income for the water customers' number. The inputs are weighted through the corresponding costs. The staff number is calculated as the full time equivalent employees. The cost of this input is the staff cost divided by the number of employees. The capital is measured through the net assets (which include intangible assets, tangible assets and financial assets). Its price is established through the capital cost, that is, through the sum of the depreciation plus the interest expenses, conveyed as a percentage of the net assets. The last of the inputs refers to the O/M quantities and it is measured through the OPEX (operating expenses), subtracting the staff costs part. The weighted form adopted for this input is an implicit price deflator that reflects the consumer price index. Both the capital quantities and the O/M quantities are measured in monetary units with 2001 reference values.
By analysing the ownership influence in the TFP, it was noticed that on average, as Figure 1 and Table 10 show, the TFP evolution was higher for the private WS and more penalising for the public ones. Table 10 presents the statistical analysis summary. In the statistical study of the relationship between the ownership and the productivity depicted in Table 11 two hypothesis tests were carried out to check if there was difference between the TFP changes in the WS by their ownership. The normality assumption was fulfilled, so the T test is valid. However, the variances equality hypothesis was not accepted and consequently neither was the assumption needed for the WMW test. It was proved that both tests enable rejection, at a 5% significance level, of the admitted H 0 hypothesis in which the TFP average would be not be different from the WS ownership.
Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
The non-parametric frontier technique of data envelopment analysis (DEA) was also employed to compare the performances of public and private WS. This technique uses mathematical programming to build an efficient frontier (technology) represented by linear segments, planes or hyperplanes, that envelope the data formed by inputs and outputs (Charnes et al., 1978) . The relative efficiency is measured by comparing the efficiency of the WS under analysis with the other WS from the sample with a similar combination of inputs and outputs. DEA also defines the peers of WS (benchmarks). It does not find support in any specification of the production function, nor does it assume an optimal behaviour for the WS. Besides, the DEA technique deals easily with multiple inputs and outputs.
Two DEA models were adopted. Model A was based on the WS features, previous literature, experts' opinion and the available data. The inputs adopted were the staff number and the other OPEX, whereas the outputs were the revenue water volume and the number of customers. Model B was computed by the stepwise methodology (Kittelsen, 1998) and adopted the total cost and the water losses as inputs and the revenue water volume as output (Marques, 2005) . As the WS are compelled to meet not only all the customers' needs, but also the demand side management policies, the model followed an input minimisation orientation (Marques & Monteiro, 2004b) . In a second phase the explanatory factors were considered by the Tobit regression application to the DEA results. Figures 2 and 3 present the noncorrected results for the technical efficiency (TE), the pure technical efficiency (PTE) and the scale efficiency (SE) 11 . The WS are sorted by decreasing order of population and by ownership, so the last 16 WS correspond to private utilities 12 . Table 12 shows the results of models A and B and their main 11 TE reflects the ability of a WS to obtain minimal inputs from a given set of outputs. TE can be decomposed into SE and PTE. SE measures the inefficiency degree due to the operation at a non-optimal scale. PTE is the remaining part of TE. 12 All the computations were performed using software in2DEA (www.in2DEA.com).
statistical features by ownership. Table 13 provides evidence of these results taking into account the operational environment. The explanatory factors considered for both models were the production cost, the domestic water volume, the customers' density and the water supply per inhabitant (as a peak factor proxy).
The results obtained show that the public WS are generally more efficient than the private ones, against expectation, especially considering that the personnel PIs computed (an OPEX proxy) were more advantageous for the latter and that in these DEA models the variables relating to the CAPEX (capital Fig. 2 . TE, PTE and SE for model A. expenses) were not accounted. Several reasons can be pointed out to justify this outcome. First, as previously underlined, the WS concessions in Portugal did not take place for ideological reasons but because those WS had serious problems. Thus, and as far as the private systems are concerned, we can find the kind of utilities whose production costs are the highest in the country and those that had more service coverage problems (requiring very high investments). So, it is natural that these might be less efficient. Second, the private WS are all very recent and therefore the costs in the first years are likely to be greater. Third, the private utilities make more use of outsourcing, reducing, on the one hand, the staff costs, and on the other allocating part of the capital costs to the OPEX (namely by subcontracting). Fourth, the private WS have greater expenses concerning their image and a greater social responsibility (owing to greater attention from the community). Besides, in order for the WS to win the contracts, they had to offer generous fees to the municipalities. Fifth, owing to a certain impoverishment of the municipalities and of the state itself, some WS provide the services at a low cost but with a very poor quality 13 . These utilities appear as erroneously efficient, distorting the remaining results. In addition, the importance of outliers is one of the DEA technique major weaknesses calling for re-doubled attention. Finally, the private sector in Portugal has characteristics which can interfere in the performance presented, namely the fact that some private utilities have the state as their main partner and others (although this is common to other countries) have construction companies rather than WS operators as shareholders. Tables 14 and 15 illustrate the statistical T tests and WMW carried out in order to prove whether or not there was difference between public and private WS. In Table 14 it was observed that for a significance level of 5% the hypothesis H o could not be accepted for both models, that is, the averages and central trends were similar for both the private and the public WS. In contrast, in Table 15 , it was possible to conclude that three of the four tests could be accepted at the significance level considered by applying the statistical tests to the models corrected by Tobit regression. The tests presented were performed for the TE measure 14 .
Concluding remarks
At a time when changing the ownership of the infrastructures of networks is indicated worldwide as being the way to lead to improvements in their operation, this document has discussed and compared the public and private management of Portuguese WS. It started by introducing the theme. Then, the Portuguese regulatory model was described. This was followed by an analysis of the private sector participation in the WS in Portugal. In Section 3 the dichotomy between public and private was examined and the main performance comparison studies were reviewed. Section 4 presented a case study, comparing the Portuguese public and private WS performance according to several aspects. The subsequent conclusions were drawn from the study:
. The growing presence of the private sector in the operation and management of WS is justified for several reasons. One of the foremost explanations, based on diverse theories (property rights, public choice and principal agent), gives the defence that the private WS are more efficient than the public ones. Unfortunately, the option for private management is not often derived from this assumption. In most of the situations it stems from the public sector inability to meet its primary obligations. Anyway, there is no consensus in the research reviewed about the performance comparison between public and private WS. Some studies suggest that the private WS are superior in efficiency when compared with the public ones, others say the opposite and others say that the performance is irrespective of the WSS ownership; . The water governance option in Portugal was for a model close to the French experience with some distinct characteristics, namely the separation between "bulk" and "distribution" water, the existence of a sector-specific regulator and the presence of the state as the major private player. Private sector involvement is already noteworthy and it is supposed to increase in the near future; . The results were not completely conclusive in the performance comparison between the Portuguese public and private WS, even though they hint at some degree of supremacy of private management, especially in water quality aspects and if some constraints are taken into account;
. In the PIs comparison of the Portuguese WS it was observed that the private WS, as a rule, presented a better performance, particularly regarding water quality, water losses and personnel PIs. This reality is undeniable on the subject of the water quality; . TFP is also more superior in the private companies than in the public ones. Possibly, this is the most reliable indicator since it considers each company's real position and their evolution over time; . Finally, in the efficiency comparison by means of the DEA technique, contrary to what might have been expected, it was not possible to observe outperformance of the private utilities when comparing them to the public ones. Several reasons can account for this result, such as the fact that in Portugal, in contrast to other countries, privatisation, with few exceptions, has occurred in problematic markets while the less troublesome remain within the public sector.
